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Interest	Deductibility	and	International	Taxation	in	Canada	
After	BEPS	Action	4	
David	G.	Duff*	
(July	1,	2019)
Introduction	
Among	 the	ways	 in	which	multinational	enterprises	 (MNEs)	 can	 shift	profits	 from	one	
jurisdiction	to	another	in	order	to	minimize	taxes,	one	of	the	most	simple	and	widely-employed	
involves	the	payment	of	interest	to	related	parties	and	third	parties.	Since	interest	is	generally	
deductible	to	the	payer	and	included	in	computing	the	recipient’s	income,1	related-party	debt	
can	 be	 used	 to	 increase	 deductible	 interest	 expenses	 in	 relatively	 high-tax	 jurisdictions	 with	
corresponding	 income	 inclusions	 in	 relatively	 low-tax	 jurisdictions.2	 Where	 a	 jurisdiction	
exempts	or	defers	the	taxation	of	income	from	foreign	affiliates,	moreover,	interest	on	related-	
or	 third-party	 debt	 that	 is	 used	 to	 finance	 the	 production	 of	 this	 income	 can	 reduce	 the	
borrower’s	 taxable	 income	without	a	corresponding	 income	 inclusion.	For	 these	 reasons,	 it	 is	
not	surprising	that	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development’s	Action	Plan	
on	 Base	 Erosion	 and	 Profit	 Shifting	 (BEPS)	 identified	 the	 deduction	 of	 interest	 and	 other	
* Professor	 and	Director	 of	 the	 Tax	 LLM	 Program,	 Peter	 A.	 Allard	 School	 of	 Law,	University	 of	 British
Columbia.	
1	 This	 discussion	 assumes	 that	 interest	 payments	 will	 continue	 to	 be	 deductible	 to	 the	 payer	 and	
included	 in	 computing	 the	 recipient’s	 income	 for	 the	 foreseeable	 future.	According	 to	a	 recent	 study,	
most	countries	tax	debt	and	equity	differently,	allowing	a	deduction	for	interest	expense	and	including	
interest	income	at	ordinary	rates,	while	denying	any	deduction	for	dividends	paid	and	typically	granting	
relief	for	dividends	received	in	the	form	of	an	exemption,	exclusion	or	credit.	James	Gadwood	and	Paul	
Morton,	“Interest	deductibility:	the	implementation	of	BEPS	Action	4:	General	Report"	Subject	1,	Cahiers	
de	Droit	Fiscal	International,	vol.	104A	(Rotterdam:	International	Fiscal	Association,	2019)	9-44	at	20.	
2	Although	the	text	refers	to	relatively	high-	and	 low-tax	“jurisdictions”,	 it	 is	more	accurate	to	refer	to	
entities	that	are	subject	to	relatively	high	or	 low	rates	of	taxation,	which	may	depend	on	special	rules	
rather	than	general	tax	rates.	For	simplicity,	however,	I	refer	here	to	relatively	high-tax	jurisdictions	and	
relatively	low-tax	jurisdictions.	
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financial	 payments	 as	 a	 significant	 source	 of	 BEPS	 concerns,3	 and	 that	 BEPS	 Action	 4	 was	
charged	with	developing	“recommendations	regarding	best	practices	 in	the	design	of	rules	to	
prevent	base	erosion	through	the	use	of	interest	expense	…	and	other	financial	payments	that	
are	economically	equivalent	to	interest	payments.”4	
Although	the	OECD	released	its	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4	in	October	20155	and	an	
update	on	this	Report	in	December	2016,6	Canada	has	yet	to	indicate	whether	it	will	take	any	
action	 to	 implement	 any	 of	 the	 best	 practices	 recommended	 in	 these	 Reports.7	 In	 the	
meantime,	several	jurisdictions,	including	the	United	States,	have	implemented	measures	that	
are	broadly	consistent	with	the	OECD’s	 	“recommended	approach”	to	 introduce	a	“fixed	ratio	
rule”	limiting	an	entity’s	net	deductions	for	interest	(and	payments	economically	equivalent	to	
interest)	to	10%	to	30%	of	the	entity’s	earnings	either	before	interest,	taxes,	depreciation	and	
amortization	 (EBITDA).8	At	 the	 same	 time,	 corporate	 tax	 rate	 reductions	 in	 the	United	States	
																																																						
3	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Cooperation	 and	 Development	 (OECD),	Action	 Plan	 on	 Base	 Erosion	 and	
Profit	Shifting,	(Paris:	OECD,	2013)	at	16	[hereafter	BEPS	Action	Plan].	
4	Ibid.	at	17.	In	general,	references	to	in	this	article	to	“interest”	include	references	to	payments	that	are	
economically	equivalent	to	interest.	
5	OECD,	 Limiting	Base	 Erosion	 Involving	 Interest	Deductions	 and	Other	 Financial	 Payments,	Action	 4	 –	
2015	Final	Report,	(Paris:	OECD,	2015)	[hereafter	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4].	
6	OECD,	Limiting	Base	 Erosion	 Involving	 Interest	Deductions	 and	Other	 Financial	Payments,	Action	4	 –	
2016	Update,	(Paris:	OECD,	2016)	[hereafter	BEPS	Action	4	Update].	
7	 This	 is	 in	 notable	 contrast	 to	 the	 federal	 government’s	 recent	 ratification	 of	 the	 Multilateral	
Convention	 to	 Implement	 Tax	 Treaty	 Related	 Measures	 to	 Prevent	 BEPS,	 which	 implements	 various	
treaty-related	 measures	 under	 other	 BEPS	 action	 plans,	 including	 in	 particular	 BEPS	 Action	 6	 on	 tax	
treaty	abuse.	
8	See	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4,	supra	note	5	at	11;	and	BEPS	Action	4	Update,	supra	note	6	at	13.	
For	a	recent	summary	of	developments	in	other	jurisdictions,	see	Gadwood	and	Morton,	supra	note	1.	
For	explanations	of	the	U.S.	rules	in	the	Tax	Cuts	and	Jobs	Act	(TCJA),	see	Peter	Harris,	Michael	Keen	and	
Li	 Liu,	 “Policy	 Forum:	 International	 Effects	 of	 the	 2017	US	 Tax	Reform	–	A	View	 from	 the	 Front	 Line”	
(2019)	67:1	Can.	Tax	J.	27-39;	Ken	McKenzie	and	Michael	Smart,	“Policy	Forum:	Business	Tax	Reform	in	
the	United	States	and	Canada”	(2019)	67:1	Can.	Tax	J.	57-66;	and	Ken	McKenzie	and	Michael	Smart,	Tax	
Policy	 Next	 to	 the	 Elephant:	 Business	 tax	 Reform	 in	 the	 Wake	 of	 the	 US	 Tax	 Cuts	 and	 Jobs	 Act,	
Commentary	No.	537,	(Toronto:	C.D.	Howe	Institute,	March	2019).	For	discussions	of	the	UK	rules,	see	
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and	the	United	Kingdom	increase	the	risk	of	profit	shifting	out	of	Canada,	making	it	advisable	
for	Canada	to	reconsider	its	rules	for	the	deduction	of	interest	expenses	and	other	base	eroding	
payments.9	
This	 article	 considers	 how	 Canada	 should	 respond	 to	 the	 recommendations	 of	 BEPS	
Action	 4	 in	 light	 of	 recent	 developments	 in	 the	U.S.	 and	other	 jurisdictions.	 The	 first	 section	
explains	the	ways	in	which	interest	payments	may	be	used	to	shift	profits	from	one	jurisdiction	
to	 another	 in	 order	 to	minimize	 taxes,	 considering	 both	 inbound	 investments	 and	 outbound	
investments,	and	why	this	base	erosion	and	profit	shifting	may	be	problematic	as	a	matter	of	
tax	 policy.	 The	 second	 section	 reviews	 Canadian	 responses	 to	 these	 profit	 shifting	 strategies	
prior	 to	BEPS	Action	4.	The	 third	 section	 summarizes	 the	 recommendations	of	BEPS	Action	4	
and	the	extent	to	which	these	recommendations	have	been	implemented	in	other	countries.	A	
final	section	concludes	by	considering	how	Canada	should	respond	to	BEPS	Action	4	in	light	of	
recent	developments	in	other	countries.	
Base	Erosion	and	Profit	Shifting	through	the	Deduction	of	Interest	Expenses	
		
	 As	the	BEPS	Action	Plan	explains,	the	deductibility	of	interest	expenses	can	give	rise	to	
base	 erosion	 and	 profit	 shifting	 in	 the	 context	 of	 inbound	 investments	 and	 outbound	
																																																																																																																																																																														
Richard	Collier,	Michael	Devereux	and	Strahil	Lepoev,	“Proposed	UK	Changes	on	the	Tax	Deductibility	of	
Corporate	 Interest	 Expense”	 [2017]	 British	 Tax	 Review	 60-79;	 Daniel	 Head	 and	 Kashif	 Javed,	 How	 to	
handle	 the	new	corporate	 interest	 restriction”	Tax	 Journal	 (27	October	2017)	10-15;	and	Antony	Ting,	
“Creating	 Interest	Expense	Out	of	Nothing	at	All	 –	Policy	Options	 to	Cap	Deductions	 to	 ‘Real’	 Interest	
Expense”	[2018]	British	Tax	Review	589-605.	See	also	the	discussion	of	the	interest	limitation	rule	in	the	
EU	Anti-Tax	Avoidance	Directive	(ATAD),	in	Ana	Paula	Dourado,	“The	Interest	Limitation	Rule	in	the	Anti-
Tax	Avoidance	Directive	(ATAD)	and	the	Net	Taxation	Principle”	(2017),	26:3	EC	Tax	Review	112-121.	
9	See,	e.g.,	Harris,	et.	al.,	supra	note	8	at	36-37;	McKenzie	and	Smart,	Tax	Policy	Next	to	the	Elephant,	
supra	note	8	at	8.	
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investments.10	From	an	inbound	perspective,	the	risk	of	BEPS	relates	primarily	to	lending	from	
an	entity	that	is	subject	to	little	or	no	tax	in	one	jurisdiction	to	a	related	entity	that	is	subject	to	
a	 relatively	 high	 rate	 of	 tax	 in	 another	 jurisdiction.	 Since	 the	 distinction	 between	 debt	 and	
equity	 makes	 little	 economic	 difference	 to	 related	 entities,	 it	 is	 relatively	 easily	 for	 these	
entities	to	convert	what	might	otherwise	be	non-deductible	dividend	payments	into	deductible	
interest	payments	by	reducing	the	equity	element	of	an	investment	and	increasing	the	amount	
of	 debt	 (thin	 capitalization).	 Where	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 debt	 exceeds	 the	 amount	 that	 the	
borrower	could	obtain	from	an	arm’s	length	party,	it	is	arguable	that	the	excess	debt	should	be	
regarded	 as	 equity	 and	 the	 interest	 paid	 on	 this	 excess	 debt	 should	 be	 characterized	 as	 a	
distribution.	Where	the	debt	exceeds	the	group’s	third-party	debt,	moreover,	a	strong	case	can	
be	made	that	the	loan	results	in	unacceptable	base	erosion	and	profit	shifting.	
	 From	an	outbound	perspective,	 the	 risk	 of	 BEPS	 involves	 the	use	of	 related-	 or	 third-
party	debt	by	an	entity	 that	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 relatively	high	 rate	of	 tax	 in	order	 to	 finance	 the	
production	of	income	by	a	related	entity	that	is	subject	to	little	or	no	tax	in	another	jurisdiction,	
which	can	be	is	distributed	to	the	first	entity	 in	the	form	of	exempt	or	deferred	dividends.	To	
the	extent	that	the	 interest	on	the	debt	 is	currently	deductible	by	the	borrowing	entity	while	
the	dividends	that	it	receives	from	the	related	entity	are	either	exempt	from	tax	or	taxable	on	a	
deferred	basis	when	received,	the	interest	expense	can	be	used	to	shelter	other	income	from	
tax	in	the	first	jurisdiction,	thereby	eroding	its	tax	base.	Since	the	debt	finances	the	production	
of	 income	 by	 a	 related	 entity	 in	 another	 jurisdiction,	moreover,	 the	 arrangement	 effectively	
shifts	profits	to	this	other	jurisdiction.	
																																																						
10	BEPS	Action	Plan,	supra	note	3	at	16.	
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	 Although	 generally	 viewed	 as	 wholly	 separate	 issues,	 the	 distinction	 between	 these	
BEPS	 risks	 can	 break	 down	 when	 one	 takes	 the	 perspective	 of	 a	 multinational	 group	 with	
entities	 in	 multiple	 jurisdictions	 subject	 to	 different	 rates	 of	 tax.	 As	 Michael	 Graetz	
demonstrates	 in	 a	 stylized	 example	 involving	 a	 multinational	 group	 with	 entities	 in	 three	
jurisdictions,	the	ability	of	the	group	to	locate	debt	and	equity	in	the	jurisdictions	from	which	it	
obtains	the	greatest	overall	tax	advantage	means	that	the	location	of	a	debt	in	one	jurisdiction	
in	order	to	finance	an	equity	investment	in	another	jurisdiction	can	simultaneously	be	viewed	
as	 an	 instance	 of	 outbound	 BEPS	 and	 an	 example	 of	 inbound	 BEPS	 attributable	 to	 thin	
capitalization.11	 From	 this	 perspective,	 it	 follows	 that	 a	 principled	 response	 to	 the	 use	 of	
related-	 and	 third-party	 debt	 for	 BEPS	 purposes	 is	 to	 allocate	 the	 group’s	 net	 third-party	
interest	expense	among	the	members	of	the	group	based	on	their	share	of	the	assets	or	income	
of	the	group	as	a	whole.12	
	 From	a	tax	policy	perspective,	the	use	of	interest	deductions	for	BEPS	purposes	may	be	
questioned	on	several	grounds.13	Beginning	with	equity	or	fairness,	the	opportunity	to	reduce	
taxes	 through	 the	 deduction	 of	 interest	 expenses	 on	 inbound	 and	 outbound	 investments	
creates	 a	 competitive	 advantage	 for	 groups	 operating	 internationally	 over	 those	 operating	
																																																						
11	Michael	J.	Graetz,	“A	Multilateral	Solution	for	the	Income	Tax	Treatment	of	Interest	Expenses”		(2008),	
62	Bulletin	for	International	Taxation	486-493	at	488,	concluding	that	“economically	similar	transactions	
will	fit	into	different	traditional	analytic	boxes	depending	on	which	country	is	examining	the	transaction	
and	 where	 the	 borrowing	 takes	 place.”	 The	 connection	 between	 inbound	 and	 outbound	 aspects	 of	
interest	deductibility	 is	particularly	clear	 in	the	context	of	so-called	“debt	dumping”	 in	which	a	foreign	
controlled	entity	borrows	funds	in	order	to	finance	an	equity	investment	in	a	related	entity	 in	another	
jurisdiction.	
12	 Ibid.,	 preferring	 allocation	 by	 assets	 over	 allocation	 by	 income	 as	 “conceptually	 more	 sound”	 and	
“probably	 easier	 to	 implement.”	 See	 also	 Choe	 Burnett,	 “Intra-Group	 Debt	 at	 the	 Crossroads:	 Stand-
Alone	versus	Worldwide	Approach”	(2014),	6	World	Tax	Journal	40-76;	J.	Vleggeert,	“Interest	Deduction	
Based	on	 the	Allocation	of	Worldwide	Debt”	 (2014),	68(2)	Bulletin	 for	 International	Taxation	103-107;	
and	Ting,	supra	note	8.	
13	See,	e.g.,	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4,	supra	note	5	at	15-16.	
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exclusively	in	a	domestic	market.	From	an	efficiency	perspective,	this	form	of	BEPS	undermines	
capital	 ownership	neutrality,	 creating	 a	 tax	preference	 for	 assets	 to	be	held	by	multinational	
groups	 instead	of	domestic	enterprises.	 It	 also	 creates	a	 tax-induced	bias	 in	 the	 cross-border	
context	towards	debt	financing,	accentuating	an	already	existing	tax	bias	toward	debt	finance	
under	most	 income	 taxes,	 due	 to	 the	 different	 tax	 treatment	 of	 returns	 to	 debt	 and	 equity.	
Finally,	the	use	of	interest	deductions	for	BEPS	purposes	reduces	government	revenues,	which	
can	have	other	distributional	and	efficiency	 implications	 to	 the	extent	 that	 reduced	 revenues	
lower	government	expenditures	or	are	offset	through	other	taxes.14	For	these	reasons,	it	is	not	
surprising	 that	 countries	 have	 adopted	 various	 approaches	 to	 limit	 opportunities	 for	 BEPS	
through	the	deduction	of	interest	expenses,	nor	that	the	OECD	decided	to	address	this	form	of	
base	erosion	and	profit	shifting	in	BEPS	Action	4.	
Canadian	Limits	on	the	Deduction	of	Interest	Expenses	Prior	to	BEPS	Action	4	
		
	 Although	Canada	has	yet	to	indicate	whether	it	will	implement	any	of	the	best	practices	
recommended	in	the	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4,	it	has	several	rules	that	limit	the	deduction	
of	 interest	 expenses	 for	 international	 tax	 planning,	 including	 in	 particular	 thin	 capitalization	
rules	for	inbound	investments	by	specified	non-residents	and	foreign	affiliate	dumping	rules	for	
outbound	 investments	by	Canadian	 resident	corporations	 that	are	controlled	by	non-resident	
corporations.15	Before	turning	to	the	recommendations	of	BEPS	Action	4,	this	section	reviews	
																																																						
14	Graetz,	supra	note	11	at	488.	
15	For	a	recent	overview	of	these	and	other	Canadian	rules	affecting	the	deduction	of	interest	expense	in	
the	 international	 context,	 see	 Amanda	 Heale	 and	 John	 Leopardi,	 “Canada”	 in	 Cahiers	 de	 Droit	 Fiscal	
International,	vol.	104A	(Rotterdam:	International	Fiscal	Association,	2019)	191-209.	
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Canadian	 experience	 with	 rules	 limiting	 the	 deduction	 of	 interest	 expenses	 on	 inbound	 and	
outbound	investments.16	
Interest	on	debt-financed	inbound	investments	
	 Canada	was	one	of	the	first	countries	in	the	world	to	enact	thin	capitalization	rules	for	
inbound	 investments,	which	were	 introduced	 in	1972.17	Although	originally	applicable	only	 to	
resident	 corporations,	 the	 rules	 were	 recently	 broadened	 to	 include	 resident	 trusts,	
partnerships	of	which	a	resident	corporation	or	trust	is	a	partner,	and	branches	of	non-resident	
corporations	and	trusts	operating	in	Canada.18	
	 Unlike	 thin	 capitalization	 rules	 in	 several	 countries	which	apply	only	where	a	 resident	
borrower	is	controlled	by	a	non-resident	lender,	the	Canadian	rules	apply	at	a	lower	threshold,	
where	the	non-resident	lender	and	non-arm’s	length	persons	own	at	least	25%	of	the	resident	
corporation’s	shares	by	votes	or	value	or	25%	of	the	fair	market	value	of	all	beneficial	interests	
in	the	trust.19	In	these	circumstances,	the	rules	disallow	the	deduction	of	otherwise	deductible	
interest	 expenses	on	 “outstanding	debts	 to	 specified	non-residents”	 to	 the	extent	 that	 these	
debts	exceed	1.5	times	the	“equity	amount”	of	the	corporation	or	trust.20	Where	the	borrower	
																																																						
16	The	discussion	below	is	based	on	David	G.	Duff,	“Action	4	of	the	OECD	Action	Plan	on	Base	Erosion	and	
Profit	 Shifting	 Initiative:	 Interest	 and	 Base-Eroding	 Payments	 –	 Insights	 from	 Canadian	 Experience”	
(2015)	69	Bulletin	for	International	Taxation	350-354	at	351-354.	
17	 Department	 of	 Finance,	 Report	 of	 the	 Technical	 Committee	 on	 Business	 Taxation	 (Ottawa:	
Department	of	Finance,	1997)	at	6.26	[hereafter	Report	of	the	Technical	Committee].	
18	Income	Tax	Act,	R.S.C.	1985,	c.	1	(5th	Supp.),	s.	18(4)	[hereafter	“ITA”].	
19	Ibid.,	definitions	of	“specified	shareholder”	and	“specified	beneficiary”	in	s.	18(5)			
20	 Ibid.,	definitions	of	“outstanding	debts	 to	specified	non-residents”	and	“equity	amount”.	 In	general,	
the	 equity	 amount	 of	 a	 corporation	 is	 the	 total	 of	 all	 retained	 earnings	 of	 the	 corporation	 at	 the	
beginning	of	the	year,	the	average	of	the	corporation’s	contributed	surplus	in	the	year	to	the	extent	that	
it	was	contributed	by	a	specified	non-resident	shareholder,	and	the	average	of	the	corporation’s	paid-up	
capital	 in	 the	year	excluding	 the	paid-up	capital	 in	 respect	of	 shares	owned	by	a	person	other	 than	a	
specified	non-resident	shareholder,	and	the	equity	amount	of	a	trust	is	the	sum	of	its	tax-paid	earnings	
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is	 a	 corporation	 or	 partnership	 of	 which	 a	 corporation	 is	 a	member,	 the	 disallowed	 interest	
expense	is	deemed	to	be	a	dividend.21	Where	the	borrower	is	a	trust	or	a	partnership	of	which	
a	trust	is	a	member,	the	trust	may	designate	the	disallowed	interest	expense	as	a	payment	of	
trust	income	to	the	non-resident	beneficiary.22	
	 While	these	thin	capitalization	rules	apply	to	back-to-back	loans,	they	do	not	otherwise	
apply	 to	 arm’s	 length	 debt,	 even	 if	 guaranteed	 by	 a	 specified	 non-resident	 shareholder	 or	
beneficiary.	To	the	extent	that	guaranteed	debt	is	easily	substituted	for	non-arm’s	length	debt,	
this	 would	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 serious	 deficiency	 in	 the	 Canadian	 rules.23	 Notwithstanding	 this	
concern,	both	the	1997	Report	of	the	Technical	Committee	on	Business	Taxation	and	the	2008	
Report	 of	 the	 Advisory	 Panel	 on	 Canada’s	 System	 of	 International	 Taxation	 questioned	
extension	of	the	thin-capitalization	rules	to	debt	guaranteed	by	specified	non-residents	on	the	
grounds	 that	 this	 could	 “disrupt	normal	 commercial	 financing	 arrangements”24	 and	 “increase	
the	 complexity	 of	 the	 current	 system	 and	 compliance	 burden	 of	 business.”25	 Although	 the	
federal	government	proposed	to	extend	the	thin	capitalization	rules	to	guaranteed	debt	in	the	
2000	Federal	Budget,26	it	withdrew	the	proposal	in	the	face	of	considerable	criticism.27	
																																																																																																																																																																														
and	 contributions	 to	 the	 trust	 from	 specified	 non-resident	 beneficiaries	 less	 capital	 distributions	 to	
specified	non-resident	beneficiaries.		
21	Ibid.,	s.	214(16).	
22	 Ibid.,	 s.	 18(5.4).	 Although	 the	 trust	may	 deduct	 this	 designated	 payment	 in	 computing	 its	 income,	 the	
designated	amount	is	subject	to	withholding	tax	under	Part	XIII	and	the	trust	may	be	subject	to	tax	under	
Part	XII.2.		
23	 Brian	 J.	 Arnold,	 Reforming	 Canada’s	 International	 Tax	 System:	 Toward	 Coherence	 and	 Simplicity,	
(Toronto:	Canadian	Tax	Foundation,	2009)	at	308.		
24	Report	of	the	Technical	Committee,	supra	note	17	at	6.29.	
25	Department	of	 Finance,	Advisory	 Panel	 on	Canada’s	 System	of	 International	 Taxation,	 Final	 Report,	
Enhancing	Canada’s	 International	Tax	Advantage,	 (Ottawa:	Department	of	Finance,	2008)	at	para	5.29	
[hereafter	Report	of	the	Advisory	Panel].	
26	Hon.	Paul	Martin,	The	Budget	Plan	2000:	Better	Finances	Better	Lives,	(February	28,	2000)	at	248.	
	 9	
	 If	the	aim	of	the	thin	capitalization	rules	 is	to	prevent	base	erosion	and	profit	shifting,	
moreover,	 it	 is	 unclear	 why	 the	 rules	 take	 into	 account	 only	 debt	 owed	 to	 specified	 non-
residents	 and	 equity	 (other	 than	 retained	 earnings)	 contributed	 by	 specified	 non-residents,	
rather	than	all	debt	and	equity	of	the	relevant	corporation	or	trust.28	Although	amended	rules	
might	continue	to	disallow	the	deduction	of	interest	expenses	only	on	debts	owing	to	specified	
non-residents,29	 considering	 all	 debt	 and	 equity	 would	 provide	 a	 better	 measure	 of	 thin	
capitalization.	
A	 further	 deficiency	 of	 Canada’s	 thin	 capitalization	 rules	 is	 the	 inflexibility	 of	 a	 fixed	
ratio,	particularly	when	data	consistently	demonstrates	 that	debt	 to	equity	 ratios	vary	widely	
among	different	industries30	as	well	as	among	firms	within	industries.31	While	one	alternative	to	
a	 single	 fixed	 ratio	 would	 be	 to	 adopt	 different	 ratios	 for	 different	 industries,32	 a	 more	
principled	 approach	would	 be	 to	 apply	 a	 debt	 to	 equity	 ratio	 for	 each	 entity	 in	 a	 corporate	
group	based	on	 the	 ratio	of	 the	group’s	external	debt	 to	 its	equity.	 	As	explained	below,	 the	
Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4	includes	an	optional	group-ratio	rule	in	addition	to	a	fixed	ratio,	
																																																																																																																																																																														
27	Department	of	Finance	News	Release,	“Finance	Minister	Clarifies	Certain	Income	Tax	Measures	in	the	
2000	Budget”	(May	9,	2000).	
28	 Arnold,	 supra	 note	 23,	 at	 313,	 arguing	 that	 “[f]or	 the	 purpose	 of	 calculating	 the	 amount	 of	 a	
corporation’s	debt	and	equity,	all	of	its	debt	and	equity	should	be	taken	into	account”.	
29	Ibid.	
30	See,	e.g.,	Report	of	the	Advisory	Panel,	supra	note	25	at	Table	5.2,	reporting	average	debt	to	equity	
ratios	 from	 2000	 to	 2005	 ranging	 from	 0.17	 for	 insurance	 carriers	 and	 related	 activities	 to	 3.76	 for	
utilities.	 See	 also	 Tim	 Edgar,	 Jonathan	 Farrar	 and	 Amin	 Mawani,	 “Foreign	 Direct	 Investment,	 Thin	
Capitalization,	and	the	 Interest	Expense	Deduction:	A	Policy	Analysis”	 (2008),	56	Canadian	Tax	Journal	
803-869	at	Table	2,	reporting	mean	debt	to	equity	ratios	from	1996	to	2005	ranging	from	approximately	
0.2	in	certain	retail	sectors	to	over	2.8	for	real	estate	and	over	45	for	hotels	and	motels.	
31	See,	e.g.,	Edgar,	Farrar	and	Mawani,	supra	note	30	at	Table	2,	reporting	standard	deviations	ranging	
from	 0.063	 for	 water	 transportation	 to	 approximately	 3.5	 for	 real	 estate	 and	 over	 5	 for	 hotels	 and	
motels.	
32	 See,	 e.g.,	 Arnold,	 supra	note	 23,	 at	 313,	 recommending	 a	 higher	 ratio	 for	 financial	 institutions	 and	
other	industries	that	are	typically	highly	leveraged.	
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allowing	 a	 taxpayer	 that	 would	 otherwise	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 fixed	 ratio	 to	 deduct	 interest	
expenses	up	to	the	group	ratio.33	
Interest	on	debt-financed	outbound	investments	
	 Until	1972,	Canadian	corporations	could	not	deduct	 interest	on	borrowed	money	 that	
was	 used	 to	 invest	 in	 Canadian	 or	 foreign	 subsidiaries.34	 Since	 then,	 Canada	 has	 allowed	 a	
deduction	for	 interest	on	borrowed	funds	used	to	earn	dividends,	even	 if	 these	dividends	are	
effectively	exempt	from	tax	as	inter-corporate	dividends	from	taxable	Canadian	corporations	or	
as	exempt	dividends	from	foreign	affiliates.35	
Under	 rules	enacted	 in	1972,	dividends	 from	a	 foreign	affiliate	were	originally	exempt	
only	if	the	affiliate	was	a	resident	of	a	state	with	which	Canada	has	entered	into	a	tax	treaty.36	
Although	Canada	had	only	16	tax	treaties	when	these	rules	were	adopted	in	1972,	this	number	
increased	substantially	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	and	Canada	now	has	over	90	tax	treaties.	As	a	
result,	 what	 was	 once	 predominantly	 a	 credit	 system	 for	 dividends	 from	 foreign	 affiliates	
gradually	morphed	into	what	is	predominantly	an	exemption	system.	
As	 this	change	became	apparent	 in	 the	1990s,	concerns	were	 raised	 in	some	quarters	
that	 the	 deduction	 of	 interest	 expenses	 on	 debt	 used	 by	 Canadian	 corporations	 to	 acquire	
																																																						
33	 See	 infra,	 notes	 93-111	 and	 accompanying	 text.	 As	 explained	 below,	 however,	 the	 OECD’s	
recommended	approach	generally	contemplates	a	group	ratio	rule	based	on	earnings	rather	than	assets.		
34	Report	of	the	Technical	Committee,	supra	note	17	at	6.11.	
35	 Since	 the	 dividends	 are	 included	 in	 computing	 the	 recipient	 corporation’s	 income	 under	 ITA	
subsection	 82(1)	 or	 90(1),	 interest	 on	 the	 borrowed	 funds	 is	 deductible	 under	 ITA	 subparagraph	
20(1)(c)(i).	To	the	extent	that	dividends	received	are	deductible	in	computing	taxable	income	under	ITA	
subsection	112(1)	or	113(1),	however,	the	dividends	are	effectively	exempt.		
36	ITA,	s.	113(1)(a)	and	the	definition	of	“exempt	surplus”	in	s.	5907	of	the	Income	Tax	Regulation,	CRC,	
c.	 945,	 as	 amended.	 These	 rules	 were	 amended	 in	 2007	 to	 extend	 exempt	 surplus	 status	 to	 foreign	
affiliates	residing	in	states	with	which	Canada	has	entered	into	a	tax	information	exchange	agreement.		
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shares	of	foreign	affiliates	was	eroding	the	Canadian	corporate	income	tax	base.37	In	1998,	the	
Report	 of	 the	 Technical	 Committee	 on	 Business	 Taxation	 considered	 the	 issue	 in	 detail,	
concluding	that	Canadian	MNEs	had	“significantly	 increased”	their	borrowings	 in	Canada	over	
the	previous	years,38	and	recommending	a	tracing	rule	as	the	simplest	and	most	familiar	way	to	
restrict	the	deduction	of	interest	on	borrowed	funds	used	to	earn	exempt	dividends.39	
Although	the	Liberal	Government	of	the	day	did	not	act	on	the	Technical	Committee’s	
recommendation,	 the	 Conservative	 Government	 proposed	 a	 broad	 tracing	 rule	 to	 limit	 the	
deduction	of	interest	expenses	on	indebtedness	incurred	to	acquire	shares	of	a	foreign	affiliate	
in	 the	 2007	 Federal	 Budget.40	 As	 Brian	 Arnold	 relates,	 however,	 “[t]he	 outrage	 of	 corporate	
Canada	was	predictable,	swift,	and	effective.”41	A	few	weeks	after	the	Budget	was	tabled,	the	
government	quietly	withdrew	its	original	proposal,	replacing	 it	with	a	targeted	anti-avoidance	
rule	that	would	disallow	the	deduction	of	interest	expenses	on	borrowed	funds	used	in	double-
dip	 financing	 arrangements	 in	 which	 an	 interest	 deduction	 was	 also	 available	 in	 another	
																																																						
37	See,	e.g.,	The	Report	of	the	Auditor	General	of	Canada	to	the	House	of	Commons,	(Ottawa:	Supply	and	
Services,	1992)	at	46-51.	
38	Report	of	 the	Technical	Committee,	 supra	note	17	at	6.12.	 This	 finding	 is	 consistent	with	academic	
studies	 cited	 in	 the	 Final	 Report	 on	 BEPS	 Action	 4,	 supra	 note	 5	 at	 17,	 concluding	 that	multinational	
groups	 leverage	 more	 debt	 in	 subsidiaries	 located	 in	 high	 tax	 countries,	 that	 thin	 capitalization	 is	
strongly	associated	with	multinational	groups,	and	that	foreign-owned	enterprises	use	more	debt	than	
domestically-owned	enterprises.		
39	Report	of	 the	Technical	Committee,	 supra	note	17	at	 6.14,	 recommending	a	 “broadly	drafted”	 rule	
that	would	disallow	the	deduction	of	interest	on	“borrowings	that	can	reasonably	be	considered,	having	
regard	to	all	of	the	circumstances,	to	have	been	used	to	assist,	directly	or	indirectly,	another	person	to	
make	the	foreign	direct	investment.”		
40	Hon.	James	M.	Flaherty,	The	Budget	Plan	2007:	Aspire	to	a	Stronger,	Safer,	Better	Canada,	 (Ottawa:	
Department	of	Finance,	March	19,	2007)	at	242-243.	
41	Arnold,	supra	note	23,	at	118.	
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jurisdiction.42	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 government	 also	 announced	 that	 it	 would	 establish	 an	
expert	 panel	 to	 “undertake	 further	 study	 and	 consultations,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 building	 on	 the	
measures	in	the	March	2007	budget,	and	identify	additional	measures	to	improve	the	fairness	
and	competitiveness	of	Canada’s	system	of	international	taxation.”43	
When	the	Advisory	Panel	reported	 in	2008,	one	of	 its	most	pointed	recommendations	
was	that	the	government	should	repeal	the	anti-double	dip	provision,	which	 it	did	before	the	
provision	came	into	effect.44		The	Advisory	Panel	also	rejected	the	idea	of	“any	restrictions	on	
the	 deductibility	 of	 interest	 expense	 incurred	 by	 Canadian	 companies	 to	 invest	 in	 foreign	
affiliates”45	on	the	following	grounds:	
Our	research	shows	that	many	businesses	based	in	other	countries	can	deduct	interest	
on	 borrowed	money	 to	 invest	 in	 a	 foreign	 company	 even	 though	 dividends	 from	 the	
foreign	 company,	 when	 repatriated,	 will	 be	 either	 exempt	 or	mostly	 free	 from	 home	
country	 tax.	While	 some	countries	have	 introduced	 targeted	 rules	aimed	at	 restricting	
outbound	 financing	 arrangements,	many	 such	 arrangements	 are	widely	 available.	 The	
Panel	believes	 that	Canada’s	 tax	 system	should	not	create	disadvantages	 for	Canadian	
businesses	when	they	compete	abroad.	
	
Canadian	 businesses	 need	 flexibility	 in	 raising	 capital	 and	 structuring	 the	 financing	 of	
their	 foreign	 acquisitions	 and	 expansions	 to	 be	 competitive	 with	 businesses	 based	 in	
other	countries.	In	the	Panel’s	view,	this	pragmatic	concern	is	of	greater	weight	than	the	
theoretical	basis	for	denying	interest	deductions	on	money	borrowed	to	invest	in	foreign	
companies	or	in	respect	of	outbound	financing	arrangements.46	
	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 Advisory	 Panel	 expressed	 “significant	 tax	 policy	 concerns”	
regarding	 debt	 dumping	 or	 debt	 pushdown	 transactions	 in	 which	 a	 Canadian	 corporation	
																																																						
42	 Department	 of	 Finance,	 “Canada’s	 New	 Government	 Improves	 Tax	 Fairness	 with	 Anti-Tax-Haven	
Initiative”	 News	 Release	 2007-041	 (14	 May	 2007).	 See	 also	 the	 accompanying	 Backgrounder,	
“International	Tax	Avoidance	and	‘Tax	Havens’	(14	May	2007).	
43	Backgrounder,	supra	note	42.	
44	S.C.	2009,	c.	2,	s.	6(1),	repealing	ITA,	s.	18.2.	
45	Report	of	the	Advisory	Panel,	supra	note	25	at	para.	4.155.	
46	Ibid.	at	paras.	4.165	and	4.166.	
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(CanSub)	controlled	by	a	foreign	corporation	(Parent)	uses	borrowed	funds	to	acquire	shares	of	
another	related	foreign	corporation	(ForSub).47	According	to	the	Report	of	the	Advisory	Panel:	
Where	there	is	no	other	connection	between	the	businesses	conducted	by	CanSub	and	
ForSub	and	especially	where	CanSub	does	not	take	part	in	the	management	of	ForSub	or	
share	 or	 benefit	 from	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 value	 of	 ForSub’s	 operations	 subsequent	 to	
CanSub’s	 investment,	 such	 a	 transaction	 has	 the	 effect	 of	 inappropriately	 reducing	
CanSub’s	 Canadian	 tax	 liability.	 It	 permits	 Parent	 to	 leverage	 its	 existing	 Canadian	
operations	by	simply	 reorganizing	 the	group’s	ownership	structure.	The	 reorganization	
may	not	have	had	any	purpose	other	than	to	shift	deductible	expenses	into	Canada.	As	a	
result,	 the	 reorganization	 reduces	 the	Canadian	 tax	base,	 generates	no	new	economic	
activity	in	Canada,	and	provides	little	or	no	benefit	to	Canadians.48	
	
For	 these	 reasons,	 the	 Panel	 recommended	 a	 specific	 anti-avoidance	 rule	 that	 would	 either	
disallow	the	deduction	of	interest	expenses	paid	by	a	foreign-controlled	Canadian	corporation	
on	 borrowed	 funds	 “used	 to	 purchase,	 directly	 or	 indirectly,	 an	 equity	 interest	 in	 a	 related	
foreign	corporation”;	or	“apply	an	appropriate	level	of	Canadian	tax	to	the	purchase	price	paid	
by	the	foreign	controlled	Canadian	corporation	in	respect	of	the	direct	or	indirect	acquisition	of	
the	equity	interest	in	the	related	foreign	corporation”	such	as	by	deeming	the	purchase	price	to	
be	a	dividend	subject	to	withholding	tax	in	Canada.	49	
Presumably	 regarding	 the	 tracing	 approach	 to	 be	 complicated	 and	 relatively	 easy	 for	
taxpayers	 to	 circumvent,	 the	 government	 settled	 on	 the	 second	 approach,	 introducing	 a	
“foreign	affiliate	dumping”	rule	in	the	2012	Federal	Budget.50	Enacted	as	s.	212.3	of	the	ITA,	this	
rule	generally	applies	whenever	a	corporation	resident	in	Canada	(CRIC)	acquires	shares	or	debt	
of,	 or	 contributes	 capital	 to,	 a	 corporation	 that	 either	 is	 a	 foreign	 affiliate	 of	 the	 CRIC	 or	
becomes	 a	 foreign	 affiliate	 after	 this	 investment,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 the	 investment	 is	
																																																						
47	Ibid.	at	paras.	5.51	and	5.52.	
48	Ibid.	at	para.	5.53.	
49	Ibid.	at	para.	5.57.	
50	Hon.	James	M.	Flaherty,	Canada’s	Economic	Action	Plan	2012:	Jogs,	Growth	and	Long-Term	Prosperity,	
(March	29,	2012)	at	423-425,		
	 14	
financed	by	debt	or	internal	funds	of	the	CRIC.	In	these	circumstances,	the	rule	generally	deems	
the	CRIC	to	have	paid	and	its	foreign	parent	to	have	received	a	dividend	equal	to	the	amount	by	
which	the	amount	 invested	 in	the	foreign	affiliate	exceeds	the	equity	of	the	foreign	parent	 in	
the	CRIC.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 foreign	affiliate	dumping	provision	 functions	 as	 an	anti-surplus-
stripping	rule	rather	than	an	interest	expense	limitation	by	discouraging	debt	dumping	as	well	
as	 other	 transactions	 that	 can	 be	 construed	 as	 economic	 substitutes	 for	 the	 distribution	 of	
dividends	by	the	CRIC	to	its	foreign	parent.	
BEPS	Action	4	and	the	Implementation	of	Best	Practices	
Canadian	experience	with	rules	limiting	the	deduction	of	interest	expenses	suggests	that	
it	is	much	easier	for	countries	acting	on	their	own	to	enact	measures	preventing	base	erosion	
and	profit	shifting	by	non-residents	than	 it	 is	 to	adopt	measures	preventing	base	erosion	and	
profit	shifting	by	resident	MNEs.51	More	generally,	as	the	Final	Report	of	BEPS	Action	4	explains,	
because	“a	robust	approach	to	restrict	interest	deductions	by	a	single	country	could	adversely	
impact	 the	attractiveness	of	 the	country	 to	 international	business	and	the	ability	of	domestic	
groups	 to	 compete	 globally”	 it	 follows	 that	 “unilateral	 action	 by	 countries	 is	 failing	 to	 tackle	
some	of	the	issues	at	the	heart	of	this	problem.”52		
For	this	reason,	the	Report	concludes,	“a	consistent	approach	utilising	international	best	
practices	would	be	a	more	effective	and	efficient	way	of	addressing	concerns	surrounding	the	
																																																						
51	 For	 a	 similar	 conclusion,	 see	 Brian	 J.	 Arnold	 and	 James	 R.	 Wilson,	 Aggressive	 Tax	 Planning	 by	
Multinational	Corporations:	The	Canadian	Context	and	Possible	Responses,	University	of	Calgary	School	
of	 Public	 Policy	 Research	 Papers,	 vol.	 7,	 no.	 29	 (September	 2014)	 at	 26,	 observing	 that	 “historically,	
Canada	has	been	vigilant	about	protecting	the	Canadian	tax	base	from	aggressive	tax	planning	by	non-
residents	 [but]	 has	 not	 been	 particularly	 concerned	 about	 the	 erosion	 of	 the	 domestic	 tax	 base	 by	
Canadian	multinationals.”	
52	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4,	supra	note	5	at	17-18.	
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use	of	 interest	 in	base	erosion	and	profit	 shifting.”53	Although	 this	 “best	practices”	approach	
does	 not	 establish	 “minimum	 standards”	 like	 those	 for	 some	other	 BEPS	Actions	 such	 as	 tax	
treaty	 abuse,	 the	OECD	 expects	 domestic	 rules	 “to	 converge	 through	 the	 implementation	 of	
agreed	 common	 approaches,	 …	 enabling	 further	 consideration	 of	 whether	 such	 measures	
should	 become	 minimum	 standards.”54	 This	 section	 reviews	 the	 “best	 practice”	
recommendations	 in	 BEPS	 Action	 4	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 recent	 developments	 in	 other	
jurisdictions	reflect	the	“convergence”	sought	by	the	OECD.	
BEPS	Action	4	Recommendations	
Before	turning	to	its	best	practices	recommendations,	the	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4	
begins	 by	 reviewing	 existing	 approaches	 to	 limiting	 the	 use	 of	 interest	 expenses	 for	 BEPS	
purposes,	identifying	six	broad	groups:	
1. Arm’s	length	tests,	which	compare	the	level	of	interest	or	debt	in	an	entity	with	the	
position	 that	 would	 have	 existed	 had	 the	 entity	 been	 dealing	 entirely	 with	 third	
parties.	
	
2. Withholding	tax	on	interest	payments,	which	are	used	to	allocate	taxing	rights	to	a	
source	jurisdiction.		
	
3. Rules	 which	 disallow	 a	 specified	 percentage	 of	 the	 interest	 expense	 of	 an	 entity,	
irrespective	of	the	nature	of	the	payment	or	to	whom	it	is	made.	
	
4. Rules	which	limit	the	level	of	interest	expense	or	debt	in	an	entity	with	reference	to	
a	fixed	ratio,	such	as	debt/equity,	interest/earnings	or	interest/total	assets.	
	
5. Rules	which	limit	the	level	of	interest	expense	or	debt	in	an	entity	with	reference	to	
the	group’s	overall	position.	
	
6. Targeted	 anti-avoidance	 rules	 which	 disallow	 interest	 expenses	 on	 specific	
transactions.55	
	
																																																						
53	Ibid.	at	18.	
54	 OECD,	 Background	 Brief:	 Inclusive	 Framework	 on	 BEPS,	 (January	 2017)	 at	 9	 [hereafter	 OECD	
Background	Brief].	
55	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4,	supra	note	5	at	19.	
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Although	 the	 Report	 notes	 than	 an	 arm’s	 length	 test	 considers	 “the	 particular	
commercial	 circumstances	 of	 an	 entity	 or	 group”	 and	 “recognises	 that	 entities	 may	 have	
different	levels	of	interest	expense	depending	on	their	circumstances,”	it	rejects	this	approach	
as	a	best	practice	to	limit	the	deduction	of	interest	expenses	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	“resource	
intensive	 and	 time	 consuming	 for	 both	 taxpayers	 and	 tax	 administrations	 to	 apply”	 and	
uncertain	 in	application	because	“each	entity	 is	considered	separately	after	arrangements	are	
entered	 into.”56	 It	 also	 rejects	 withholding	 taxes	 as	 a	 best	 practice	 to	 address	 BEPS-related	
interest	expenses	on	the	grounds	that	withholding	tax	rates	would	have	to	match	corporate	tax	
rates	 to	 eliminate	 BEPS	 opportunities	 but	 are	 generally	 reduced	 to	 much	 lower	 levels	
(sometimes	 to	 zero)	 under	 bilateral	 tax	 treaties,57	 and	 rejects	 rules	 disallowing	 a	 specified	
percentage	 of	 an	 entity’s	 interest	 expense	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 these	 rules	 do	 not	 specifically	
target	BEPS	risks	associated	with	high	levels	of	debt.58	At	the	same	time,	it	suggests	that	“these	
rules	may	 still	 have	 a	 role	 to	 play	within	 a	 country’s	 tax	 system	 alongside	 the	 best	 practice	
approach,	either	in	supporting	those	rules	or	in	meeting	other	tax	policy	goals,”59	concluding	on	
this	 basis	 that	 countries	 may	 “continue	 to	 apply	 an	 arm’s	 length	 test,	 withholding	 tax	 on	
interest,	or	rules	to	disallow	a	percentage	of	an	entity’s	total	interest	expense,	so	long	as	these	
																																																						
56	 Ibid.,	 recognizing	 however	 that	 uncertainty	 can	 be	 reduced	 through	 advance	 agreements	 with	 tax	
administrations.	
57	Ibid.	at	20,	adding	that	“there	are	broader	policy	reasons	why	some	countries	do	not	currently	apply	
withholding	tax	to	interest	payments,	which	could	make	the	introduction	of	new	taxes	difficult.”	
58	 Ibid.	 at	 20,	 observing	 that	 these	 rules	 are	 “likely	 to	 be	more	 effective	 in	 reducing	 the	 general	 tax	
preference	for	debt	over	equity,	than	in	targeting	base	erosion	and	profit	shifting	involving	interest.”	
59	Ibid	
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do	 not	 reduce	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 best	 practice	 approach	 in	 tackling	 base	 erosion	 and	
profit	shifting.”60	
	 In	contrast	to	these	rules,	the	Report	bases	its	best	practice	approach	on	“a	combination	
of	some	or	all	of	the	rules	in	groups	4	to	6”.61	According	to	the	Report:	
A	general	 limit	on	 interest	deductions	would	 restrict	 the	ability	of	an	entity	 to	deduct	
net	interest	expense	based	on	a	fixed	financial	ratio.	This	could	be	combined	with	a	rule	
to	allow	the	entity	to	deduct	more	 interest	up	to	the	group’s	equivalent	financial	ratio	
where	this	is	higher….	These	general	rules	should	be	complemented	by	targeted	rules	to	
address	planning	to	reduce	or	avoid	the	effect	of	 the	general	 rules,	and	targeted	rules	
can	also	be	used	to	tackle	specific	risks	not	covered	by	the	general	rules.	This	approach	
should	provide	effective	protection	for	countries	against	base	erosion	and	profit	shifting	
involving	 interest,	 but	 should	 not	 prevent	 businesses	 from	 raising	 the	 debt	 finance	
necessary	for	their	business	and	commercial	investments.62	
	
The	 following	 discussion	 considers	 each	 element	 of	 this	 best	 practices	 approach,	
addressing	the	rationale	for	and	design	of	a	fixed	ratio	rule,	an	optional	group	ratio	rule,	
optional	 rules	 providing	 for	 the	 carryover	 of	 disallowed	 interest	 expense	 and	 unused	
interest	capacity,	and	targeted	anti-avoidance	rules.	
Fixed	ratio	rule	
Although	a	principled	approach	to	limit	the	deduction	of	BEPS-related	interest	expenses	
would	 allocate	 the	 net	 third-party	 interest	 expense	 of	 corporate	 groups	 among	 its	members	
based	 on	 their	 share	 of	 the	 assets	 or	 income	 of	 the	 group	 as	 a	 whole,63	 the	 consistent	
application	of	an	allocation	rule	along	these	lines	would	require	agreement	on	the	definition	of	
the	 group	 to	 which	 the	 rule	 would	 apply,	 on	 the	 calculation	 of	 the	 group’s	 net	 third	 party	
interest	 expense,	 and	 on	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 such	 expenses	 would	 be	 allocated	 among	
																																																						
60	Ibid.	at	20-21.	
61	Ibid.	at	21.	
62	Ibid.	
63	Supra	note	12	and	accompanying	text.		
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members	of	the	group.64	As	a	result,	although	the	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4	acknowledges	
that	worldwide	allocation	would	be	an	ideal	approach,65	it	recommends	a	fixed	ratio	rule	as	a	
much	 simpler	 approach	 for	entities	 to	apply	 and	 tax	administrations	 to	administer,66	with	an	
optional	 group	 ratio	 rule	 as	 supplementary	 rule	 that	 could	 permit	 the	 deduction	 of	 interest	
expenses	exceeding	the	fixed	ratio.67	
While	a	fixed	ratio	rule	could	be	based	on	a	ratio	debt	to	equity,	as	with	Canada’s	thin	
capitalization	 rules,	 or	 on	 a	 ratio	 of	 interest	 expense	 to	 earnings,	 the	 Final	 Report	 on	 BEPS	
Action	 4	 favours	 the	 latter	 approach	 for	 several	 reasons.	 First,	 because	 the	 use	 of	 interest	
payments	for	BEPS	purposes	depends	on	the	deductible	expenses	incurred	by	an	entity,	a	limit	
based	on	a	 ratio	of	 interest	 to	earnings	addresses	 the	 risk	of	BEPS	more	directly	 than	a	 limit	
based	on	a	ratio	of	debt	to	equity.68	Second,	since	it	would	be	impractical	to	measure	the	fair	
market	value	of	an	entity’s	assets	in	order	to	determine	the	value	of	its	equity,	a	ratio	based	on	
interest	to	earnings	may	provide	a	more	accurate	measure	of	an	entity’s	economic	activity	than	
a	 ratio	based	on	debt	 to	equity.69	Third,	 to	 the	extent	 that	an	 interest	 to	earnings	 ratio	 links	
allowable	 interest	deductions	 to	 taxable	 income,	 the	rule	 is	more	robust	against	 tax	planning	
																																																						
64	Duff,	supra	note	16	at	350.	
65	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4,	supra	note	4	at	18,	stating	that	“a	consistent	approach	utilising	best	
practices	…	should	encourage	groups	to	adopt	funding	structures	whereby:	(i)	the	net	interest	expense	
of	 an	 entity	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 overall	 net	 interest	 expense	 of	 the	 group;	 and	 (ii)	 the	 distribution	 of	 a	
group’s	net	interest	expense	should	be	linked	to	income-producing	activities.”	
66	Ibid.	at	47.	
67	Ibid.	at	57-66;	BEPS	Action	4	Update,	supra	note	6	at	117-168.	
68	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4,	supra	note	5	at	37	and	43,	stating	that	“measuring	economic	activity	
using	earnings	should	be	the	most	effective	way	to	ensure	that	the	ability	to	deduct	net	interest	expense	
is	matched	with	the	activities	that	generate	taxable	income	and	drive	value	creation.”	
69	Ibid.	at	44-45,	noting	that	amortized	historical	costs	“could	give	rise	to	inconsistencies	depending	
upon	the	age	of	assets”	would	generally	exclude	internally	created	intangible	assets,	and	would	be	
“subject	to	influence	by	decisions	of	management,	for	instance	on	depreciation	periods	and	the	timing	
of	revaluations	and	write	downs.”		
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than	a	debt	to	equity	ratio,70	which	may	be	manipulated	by	increasing	the	level	of	equity	in	an	
entity.71	Fourth,	a	rule	based	an	interest	to	earnings	ratio	can	also	be	easily	adapted	to	exclude	
specific	 categories	 of	 income	 from	 the	 definition	 of	 earnings,	 so	 that	 the	 rule	 limits	 the	
deduction	of	interest	expenses	on	borrowed	funds	used	to	finance	tax-exempt	and	tax-deferred	
income.72	Fifth,	since	the	OECD’s	best	practices	approach	would	also	apply	to	payments	such	as	
guarantee	 fees,	 notional	 interest	 on	 derivative	 instruments	 and	 the	 finance	 cost	 element	 of	
finance	 lease	 payments,73	 an	 interest	 to	 earnings	 ratio	 is	more	 amenable	 to	 the	 inclusion	 of	
these	 payments	 than	 a	 debt	 to	 equity	 ratio	 for	which	 a	 corresponding	 debt	may	 not	 exist.74	
Sixth,	while	a	 limit	based	on	a	ratio	of	 interest	to	earnings	automatically	addresses	BEPS	risks	
resulting	from	an	excessive	rate	of	interest,	a	limit	based	on	a	debt	to	equity	ratio	requires	an	
additional	set	of	rules,	such	as	an	arm’s	length	test,	to	address	these	risks.75		Finally,	the	Report	
adds,	since	the	amount	of	an	entity’s	debt	may	vary	throughout	a	taxable	period,	while	interest	
expenses	 automatically	 reflect	 changes	 in	 borrowings	 throughout	 the	 period,	 an	 interest	 to	
earnings	ratio	provides	“a	more	accurate	picture	of	the	entity’s	actual	taxable	position	over	the	
period”	than	a	debt	to	equity	ratio.76	Although	the	last	two	reasons	seem	somewhat	overblown	
in	the	Canadian	context,	given	a	reasonableness	 limit	on	the	deduction	of	 interest	expenses77	
																																																						
70	 Ibid.	 at	 26	 and	 43,	 noting	 that:	 “Where	 the	 level	 of	 deductible	 expense	 in	 an	 entity	 is	 linked	 to	
earnings,	a	group	can	only	increase	net	interest	deductions	in	a	particular	country	by	increasing	earnings	
in	that	country.	Similarly,	any	restructuring	to	move	profits	out	of	a	country	will	also	reduce	net	interest	
deductions	in	the	country.”	
71	Ibid.	at	21.	
72	Ibid.	at	43.	
73	Ibid.	at	29-31.	
74	Ibid.	at	37	and	43.	
75	Ibid.	at	37,	adding	that	this	additional	step	would	“increase	complexity.”	
76	Ibid.	
77	ITA,	s.	20(1)(c).	
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and	an	averaging	approach	for	computing	debt	and	equity	under	the	thin	capitalization	rules,78	
the	other	 reasons	provide	a	 strong	 case	 for	 a	 rules	based	on	an	 interest	 to	earnings	 ratio	as	
opposed	to	a	debt	to	equity	ratio.79	
Regarding	the	design	of	this	fixed	ratio	rule,	the	Report	recommends	that	it	should	limit	
an	entity’s	net	interest	expenses,	not	gross	interest	expense,80	that	earnings	should	be	defined	
as	 earnings	 before	 interest,	 taxes,	 depreciation	 and	 amortization	 (EBITDA)	 less	 non-taxable	
income	such	as	exempt	dividends	or	branch	profits	subject	to	a	participation	exemption,81	and	
that	the	fixed	ratio	of	allowable	net	interest	expenses	should	fall	within	a	“corridor”	of	10%	to	
30%	of	EBITDA.82		Although	a	limit	on	gross	interest	expense	would	be	administratively	simpler	
and	more	robust	to	tax	planning,	a	net	 interest	rule	would	reduce	the	risk	of	double	taxation	
and	 allow	 an	 entity	 to	 borrow	 from	 third	 parties	 and	 on-lend	 funds	within	 a	 group	without	
limiting	its	gross	income	expense.83	Defining	earnings	as	EBITDA	is	favoured	on	the	grounds	that	
it	 is	“the	most	common	measure	of	earnings	currently	used	by	countries	with	earnings-based	
tests”	and	“a	measure	of	earnings	which	is	often	used	by	lenders	in	deciding	how	much	interest	
expense	 an	 entity	 can	 reasonably	 afford	 to	 bear”84	 –	 though	 the	 Report	 also	 states	 that	 a	
																																																						
78	ITA,	s.	18(4)(a)(i)	and	the	definition	of	“equity	amount”	in	s.	18(5).	
79	 For	 a	 contrary	 view,	 which	 among	 other	 things	 questions	 reliance	 on	 EBITDA	 as	 a	 reliable	 and	
consistent	measure	of	a	taxpayer’s	economic	activity,	see	Craig	Elliffe,	“Interest	Deductibility:	Evaluating	
the	Advantage	of	Earnings	Stripping	Regimes	in	Preventing	Thin	Capitalization”	[2017]	New	Zealand	Law	
Review	257-284.	
80	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4,	supra	note	5	at	38-39.	
81	 Ibid.	 at	 44,	 adding	 that	 appropriate	 adjustments	 should	 be	 made	 to	 address	 BEPS	 considerations	
where	dividends	or	branch	income	are	subject	to	tax	with	a	credit.	
82	Ibid.	at	49-50.	
83	 Ibid.	at	38.	Since	entities	may	disguise	other	forms	of	taxable	income	as	interest	and/or	use	interest	
expenses	to	shelter	net	interest	income	from	tax,	the	Report	also	recommends	“targeted	provisions	to	
disallow	gross	interest	expense	in	specific	situations	identified	as	posing	base	erosion	and	profit	shifting	
risk.”	Ibid	at	39.	
84	Ibid.	at	44.	
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country	 may	 chose	 to	 adopt	 earnings	 before	 interest	 and	 taxes	 (EBIT)	 as	 an	 alternative	
definition	of	earnings.85	And	the	suggested	range	of	10%	to	30%	aims	to	exclude	a	majority	of	
multinational	groups	while	limiting	opportunities	for	significant	BEPS	through	the	deduction	of	
interest	 expenses.86	 Given	 the	 pragmatic	 choice	 of	 a	 fixed	 ratio	 rule,	 each	 of	 these	
recommendations	seems	reasonable.	
As	for	the	scope	of	the	rule,	the	Report	suggest	that	it	should	at	a	minimum	apply	to	all	
entities	that	are	part	of	a	multinational	group,87	but	could	also	apply	to	domestic	groups	and	
standalone	entities	that	pose	particular	BEPS	risks.88	Where	a	rule	applies	only	to	multinational	
groups,	 the	 Report	 also	 recommends	 a	 targeted	 rule	 to	 prevent	 BEPS	 through	 interest	
payments	to	related	parties	and	third	parties	under	structured	arrangements	such	as	back-to-
back	loans.89	Where	a	group	has	more	than	one	entity	in	a	particular	country,	it	also	suggests	
that	 the	 ratio	 should	 apply	 to	 overall	 position	 of	 the	 domestic	 group,	 which	 would	 allow	 a	
highly	 leveraged	entity	 to	deduct	 interest	 expenses	 if	 the	net	 interest	 to	 EBITDA	 ratio	of	 the	
domestic	 group	 adheres	 to	 the	 fixed	 ratio.90	 The	 Report	 also	 recommends	 an	 optional	 de	
minimis	 monetary	 threshold	 to	 exclude	 low-risk	 entities	 and	 reduce	 administration	 and	
																																																						
85	 Ibid.	 at	 45.	 Because	 EBIT	 is	 always	 smaller	 than	 EBITDA	 for	 any	 entity	 with	 depreciation	 and	
amortization,	the	application	of	a	fixed	ratio	at	a	specific	rate	will	necessarily	be	less	generous	where	the	
definition	of	earnings	is	based	on	EBIT	than	EBITDA.	
86	Ibid.	at	49-50,	referring	to	financial	data	of	publicly-traded	multinational	groups	indicating	that	62%	of	
these	groups	would	be	able	to	deduct	all	net	third	party	interest	expense	under	a	fixed	ratio	of	10%	and	
87%	of	these	groups	would	be	able	to	deduct	all	net	third	party	interest	expense	under	a	fixed	ratio	of	
30%.	Where	a	fixed	ratio	rule	bases	its	definition	of	earnings	on	EBIT	rather	than	EBITDA,	it	follows	that	
the	range	of	ratios	might	be	larger	than	10%	to	30%.	
87	Ibid.	at	33-34.	For	this	purpose,	the	Report	defines	a	multinational	group	as	“a	group	that	operates	in	
more	than	one	jurisdiction,	 including	through	a	permanent	establishment”,	and	generally	considers	an	
entity	 to	 be	 part	 of	 a	 group	 if	 it	 is	 “directly	 or	 indirectly	 controlled	 by	 a	 company,	 or	 the	 entity	 is	 a	
company	which	directly	or	indirectly	controls	one	or	more	other	entities.”	
88	Ibid.	at	33.	
89	Ibid.	at	34	and	72-74.	
90	Ibid.	at	33.	
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compliance	costs.91	It	also	contemplates	an	option	to	exclude	certain	public	benefit	projects	on	
the	grounds	that	the	nature	of	these	assets	and	their	close	connection	with	the	public	sector	
mean	that	they	present	little	or	no	risk	of	BEPS.92	
Group	ratio	rule	
Although	the	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4	recommends	a	fixed	ratio	rule	as	a	simpler	
rule	 for	 entities	 to	 apply	 and	 tax	 administrations	 to	 administer,93	 it	 also	 contemplates	 an	
optional	 group	 ratio	 rule	 as	 supplementary	 rule	 that	 could	 permit	 the	 deduction	 of	 interest	
expenses	 exceeding	 the	 fixed	 ratio.94	 The	 purpose	 of	 this	 rule	 is	 to	 allow	 the	 deduction	 of	
interest	 expenses	 incurred	 by	 highly	 leveraged	 groups	 where	 this	 interest	 is	 attributable	 to	
external	 debt	 of	 the	 group	 at	 a	 whole	 rather	 than	 base	 erosion	 and	 profit	 shifting.95	 By	
providing	 this	 flexibility	 for	 highly	 leveraged	 groups,	moreover,	 the	 Report	 suggests	 that	 the	
fixed	 ratio	 can	 be	 set	 relatively	 low,	 “making	 sure	 that	 the	 fixed	 ratio	 rule	 is	 effective	 in	
combating	 base	 erosion	 and	 profit	 shifting,	 while	 the	 group	 ratio	 rule	 compensates	 for	 the	
blunt	operation	of	such	a	rule.”96	
As	with	 a	 fixed	 ratio	 rule,	 a	 group	 ratio	 rule	 could	 be	 based	 asset-based	 or	 earnings-
based,	allowing	the	deduction	of	net	interest	expenses	above	the	fixed	ratio	either	where	the	
entity’s	 equity	 to	 total	 assets	 ratio	 equals	 or	 exceeds	 that	 of	 the	 group	 (an	 “equity	 escape	
rule”),	 or	where	 its	 net	 interest	 to	 EBITDA	 ratio	does	not	 exceed	 the	net	 third-party	 interest	
																																																						
91	 Ibid.	 at	 35.	 Where	 the	 ratio	 applies	 to	 individual	 entities	 separately,	 not	 the	 overall	 position	 of	
domestic	 groups,	 the	Report	 also	 suggests	 anti-fragmentation	 rules	 to	prevent	 a	 group	 from	avoiding	
the	rule	by	establishing	multiple	entities,	each	of	which	falls	below	the	threshold.		
92	Ibid.	at	39-40.	
93	Ibid.	at	47.	
94	Ibid.	at	57-66,	BEPS	Action	4	Update,	supra	note	6	at	117-168.	
95	Ibid.	at	127.	
96	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4,	supra	note	5	at	57.	
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expense	 to	 EBITDA	 ratio	 of	 the	 group	 as	 a	 whole.97	While	 an	 asset-based	 approach	 is	more	
likely	than	an	earnings-based	approach	to	disallow	the	deduction	of	interest	expenses	incurred	
by	 an	 entity	 that	 is	more	 highly	 leveraged	 than	 its	 group,	 it	may	 be	more	 generous	 than	 an	
earnings-based	approach	for	an	entity	with	losses,	provided	that	it	is	not	more	highly	leveraged	
than	the	group	as	a	whole.98	Although	the	OECD	considers	both	alternatives	consistent	with	its	
best	practices	approach,99	both	the	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4	and	the	2016	Update	devote	
most	of	their	attention	to	the	design	and	operation	of	a	group	ratio	rule	using	a	net	third	party	
interest	to	EBITDA	ratio.100	
In	order	 to	apply	 such	a	 rule,	 it	 is	necessary	 first	 to	define	 the	group	whose	net	 third	
party	 interest	to	EBITDA	ratio	must	be	determined,	then	to	calculate	both	the	net	third	party	
interest	expense	of	this	group	and	the	EBITDA	of	this	group	(making	appropriate	adjustments	
for	exempt	income	and	income	that	is	sheltered	from	tax	by	foreign	tax	credits),	and	finally	to	
compare	 the	 ratio	 of	 the	 group’s	 net	 third	 party	 interest	 to	 EBITDA	 to	 that	 of	 the	 entity	 (or	
domestic	group).101	Beginning	with	the	definition	of	a	multinational	group,	the	Report	suggests	
that	“a	practical	and	workable	definition	of	a	group	is	one	that	is	based	on	a	consolidated	group	
for	financial	accounting	purposes”	including	“a	parent	company	and	all	entities	which	are	fully	
																																																						
97	 For	 a	 brief	 discussion	 of	 issues	 involved	 in	 the	 design	 of	 an	 equity	 escape	 rule,	 see	 ibid.	 at	 91-92	
(Annex	C).		
98	Ibid.	at	58.	
99	Ibid.	
100	 Ibid.	at	58-66;	and	BEPS	Action	4	Update,	supra	note	6	at	119-168.	Although	the	attention	that	the	
OECD	 devoted	 to	 an	 earnings-based	 group	 ratio	 rules	 strongly	 suggests	 that	 this	 is	 its	 preferred	
alternative,	 this	may	 also	 be	 because	 no	 country	 applied	 an	 earnings-based	 group	 ratio	 rule	 prior	 to	
BEPS	Action	4,	while	more	than	one	country	applied	an	equity	escape	rule.	
101	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4,	supra	note	5	at	59-63.	
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consolidated	on	a	line-by-line	basis	in	the	parent’s	consolidated	financial	statements.”102	To	the	
extent	that	these	consolidated	financial	statements	do	not	 include	related	parties	outside	the	
group,	however,	the	Report	recommends	either	expanding	the	definition	of	a	group	to	include	
specified	 related	 parties	 or	 adding	 a	 targeted	 anti-avoidance	 rule	 to	 prevent	 a	 group	 from	
inflating	its	net	third	party	interest	to	EBITDA	ratio	by	paying	interest	to	a	related	party	outside	
the	group.103	
Likewise	 with	 a	 group’s	 net	 third	 party	 interest	 expense	 and	 EBITDA,	 the	 Report	
recommends	 that	 the	 calculation	 of	 these	 amounts	 can	 generally	 be	 based	 on	 figures	 taken	
from	 a	 group’s	 consolidated	 financial	 statements,104	 though	 the	 Report	 also	 contemplates	
specific	 adjustments	 to	 these	 amounts	 to	 ensure	 a	more	 accurate	picture	of	 the	 group’s	 net	
third	party	interest	expense	and	earnings.105	It	also	suggests	that	countries	may	choose	to	allow	
an	“uplift”	of	net	third	party	interest	expense	of	up	to	10%	in	order	to	“reduce	the	risk	that	all	
of	a	group’s	actual	net	third	party	interest	expense	is	not	taken	into	account”,106	and	proposes	
special	 rules	 to	 address	 the	 impact	 of	 loss-making	 entities	 on	 the	operation	of	 a	 group	 ratio	
rule.107	
																																																						
102	Ibid.	at	59.	Where	a	country	adopts	a	group	ratio	rule	in	addition	to	a	fixed	ratio	rule,	the	Report	adds	
that	 the	 country	may	want	 to	 use	 the	 same	 definition	 of	 a	 group	 for	 the	 fixed	 ratio	 rule	 in	 order	 to	
reduce	the	risk	that	an	entity	that	 is	subject	to	the	fixed	ratio	rule	cannot	access	the	group	ratio	rule.	
Ibid.	at	33.	
103	Ibid.	at	60.	
104	Ibid.	at	62	and	63.	
105	 Ibid.	 at	 62-63;	 and	 BEPS	 Action	 4	 Update,	 supra	 note	 5	 at	 123-130,	 for	 example,	 including	 in	
computing	a	group’s	net	third	party	interest	expense	interest	that	is	included	within	other	categories	of	
income	or	 expense	 in	 the	 consolidated	 income	 statement	 and	excluding	 interest	payments	 to	 related	
parties	that	are	not	members	of	the	group.	See	also	Ibid.	at	132-33,	suggesting	that	the	group’s	EBITDA	
be	adjusted	to	take	into	account	the	interest	income	and	expense	of	associates	and	joint	venture	entity.	
106	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4,	supra	note	5	at	62-63.	
107	Ibid.	at	65-66;	and	BEPS	Action	4	Update,	supra	note	6	at	139-143.	
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Although	it	 is	 impossible	for	this	article	to	examine	each	element	of	the	OECD’s	group	
ratio	rule	in	detail,	the	rationale	for	such	a	rule	as	a	supplement	to	a	fixed	ratio	rule	is	sound,	
and	 the	 OECD’s	 approach	 seems	 to	 be	 administratively	 feasible	 since	 consolidated	 financial	
statements	 are	 often	 publicly	 available	 and	 provide	 relatively	 reliable	 information	 on	 the	
finances	 of	 worldwide	 groups.108	 Whether	 an	 earnings-based	 approach	 is	 preferable	 to	 an	
equity	 escape	 rule,	 however,	 is	 less	 clear,	 particularly	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 an	 earnings-based	
approach	 requires	 additional	 rules	 to	 address	 circumstances	 in	 which	 individual	 entities	 or	
groups	 have	 negative	 EBITDA.109	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 perhaps	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	 Final	
Report	on	BEPS	Action	4	acknowledged	that	no	country	applied	an	earnings-based	group	ratio	
rule,	while	more	than	one	country	applied	an	asset-based	rule,110	nor	that	most	countries	with	
a	group	ratio	rule	after	BEPS	Action	4	apply	an	equity	escape	rule	rather	than	an	earnings-based	
approach.111	
Carryover	of	disallowed	interest	expense	and	unused	interest	capacity	
Where	net	interest	expenses	of	an	entity	exceed	the	limit	set	by	a	fixed	ratio	rule,	these	
expenses	may	be	allowed	under	a	group	ratio	rule.	 If	a	country	does	not	adopt	a	group	ratio	
rule	 or	 the	 interest	 expenses	 exceed	 the	 limit	 under	 the	 group	 ratio	 rule,	 however,	 the	
deduction	of	 these	“excessive”	 interest	expenses	will	be	disallowed.	 In	 this	circumstance,	 the	
Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4	explains	that	countries	may	want	to	permit	disallowed	 interest	
																																																						
108	For	a	contrary	view,	see	Elliffe,	supra	note	79	at	271-274.	
109	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4,	supra	note	5	at	65-66;	BEPS	Action	4	Update,	supra	note	6	at	139-143.	
110	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4,	supra	note	5	at	58,	referring	to	Finland	and	Germany.	
111	 Gadwood	 and	Morton,	 supra	 note	 1	 at	 32,	 reporting	 that	 six	 European	 Union	 countries	 (Finland,	
France,	Germany,	Hungary,	Luxembourg	and	Malta)	as	well	as	Norway	supplement	their	earnings-based	
fixed-ratio	 rule	 with	 an	 equity-escape	 rule”,	 while	 Argentina,	 Denmark	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom	
supplement	their	earnings-based	fixed-ratio	rule	with	an	earnings-based	group-ratio	rule.	
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expenses	 to	be	 carried	over	 to	other	 taxation	 years	 –	 either	 forward	 to	 subsequent	 taxation	
years	or	both	forward	and	back	to	previous	taxation	years.112	In	addition,	the	Report	suggests,	
where	 an	 entity’s	 net	 interest	 expenses	 are	 less	 than	 the	 interest	 expense	 that	 would	 be	
allowed	 under	 a	 fixed	 ratio	 or	 a	 group	 ratio,	 countries	 may	 way	 to	 allow	 the	 carryover	 of	
unused	 interest	capacity	that	could	be	used	 in	other	taxation	years	to	allow	the	deduction	of	
interest	expenses	exceeding	the	fixed	ratio	or	group	ratio	in	those	years.	
Although	these	carryover	provisions	would	lessen	the	impact	of	an	earnings-based	fixed	
ratio	rule	on	entities	with	relatively	volatile	earnings,	the	existence	of	these	rules	could	create	
new	BEPS	risks	since	entities	with	unused	interest	capacity	could	be	incentivized	to	increase	net	
interest	 expenses	 or	 decrease	 EBITDA	 in	 future	 periods	 if	 unused	 interest	 capacity	 can	 be	
carried	forward,	while	a	provision	allowing	entities	to	carry	back	disallowed	interest	expenses	
may	 encourage	 entities	 to	 increase	 net	 interest	 expenses	 oar	 decrease	 EBITDA	 in	 a	 current	
taxation	year	 in	order	 to	carry	disallowed	 interest	expenses	back	 to	prior	 taxation	years	with	
unused	 interest	 capacity.113	 Carryover	 provisions	 also	 create	 valuable	 tax	 attributes,	 which	
would	presumably	be	subject	 to	restrictions	on	their	use	 following	a	change	 in	control	of	 the	
entity.114	 For	 these	 reasons,	 where	 carryover	 provisions	 are	 contemplated,	 these	 might	
reasonably	be	limited	to	the	carry	forward	of	disallowed	interest	expenses.	
Targeted	rules	
A	final	element	of	the	OECD’s	proposed	best	practices	approach	involves	targeted	rules	
that	 supplement	 more	 general	 interest	 limitation	 rules	 or	 prevent	 the	 avoidance	 of	 these	
																																																						
112	Ibid.	at	68-70.	
113	Ibid.	at	69.	
114	Ibid.	
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general	 rules.115	 Emphasizing	 that	 “targeted	 rules	 can	 also	 provide	 an	 effective	 response	 to	
some	 base	 erosion	 and	 profit	 shifting	 risk”,	 for	 example,	 the	 Final	 Report	 on	 BEPS	 Action	 4	
states	that	a	country	may,	in	addition	to	a	fixed	ratio	rule,	apply	a	thin	capitalization	rule	based	
on	a	fixed	debt	to	equity	ratio	in	order	to	disallow	interest	on	excessive	debt,	and	that	this	rule	
could	disallow	the	deduction	of	 interest	expenses	“even	where	an	entity	does	not	exceed	the	
level	 of	 net	 interest	 expense	 permitted	 under	 the	 fixed	 ratio	 rule.”116	 As	 noted	 earlier,	 the	
Report	 also	 recommends	 a	 targeted	 rule	 to	 prevent	 base	 erosion	 and	profit	 shifting	 through	
interest	payments	to	related	parties	and	third	parties	under	structured	arrangements	such	as	
back-to-back	 loans.117	 It	 also	 suggests	 that	 countries	 should	 adopt	 anti-avoidance	 rules	 to	
combat	arrangements	designed	to	reduce	an	entity’s	net	 interest	expense	such	as	converting	
interest	 expense	 into	 a	 different	 form	 of	 deductible	 expense	 or	 converting	 other	 taxable	
income	into	a	form	which	is	economically	equivalent	to	interest.118	
Implementation	of	Best	Practices	in	Other	Countries	
In	 the	 years	 since	 the	 Final	 Report	 on	 BEPS	 Action	 4	 was	 released	 in	 2015,	 several	
jurisdictions	 around	 the	 world	 have	 moved	 to	 implement	 key	 elements	 of	 the	 OECD’s	 best	
practices	approach.	In	2016,	for	example,	the	European	Union	adopted	an	Anti	Tax	Avoidance	
Directive	 (ATAD),	 requiring	 member	 states	 to	 implement	 a	 number	 of	 anti	 tax	 avoidance	
provisions,	including	an	interest	limitation	rule	based	on	the	recommendations	of	BEPS	Action	
																																																						
115	Ibid.	at	71-74.	
116	Ibid.	at	71.	
117	Supra,	text	accompanying	note	89.	
118	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4,	supra	note	5	at	72.	
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4,	 in	most	cases	no	 later	 than	 January	1,	2019.119	According	 to	Article	4	of	 this	Directive,	 the	
interest	limitation	rule	should	include	the	following	elements:	
(1)	 a	 fixed	 ratio	 rule	 limiting	 the	deduction	of	 net	 interest	 expenses	 exceeding	
30%	of	a	taxpayer’s	EBITDA	less	tax-exempt	income;		
	
(2)	 a	monetary	 threshold	 of	 €3	million	 and	 exemptions	 for	 standalone	 entities	
and	 loans	 used	 to	 fund	 long-term	 public	 infrastructure	 projects	 where	 the	
project	 operator,	 borrowing	 costs,	 assets	 and	 income	 are	 all	 in	 the	 European	
Union;	
	
(3)	 a	 group	 ratio	 rule	 allowing	 a	 taxpayer	 that	 is	 a	member	 of	 a	 consolidated	
group	 for	 financial	 accounting	 purposes	 to	 deduct	 net	 interest	 expenses	
exceeding	the	fixed	ratio	either	(a)	where	the	ratio	of	the	taxpayer’s	equity	to	its	
assets	is	at	least	2%	less	than	the	equity	to	asset	ratio	of	the	group	or	(b)	where	
the	 ratio	 of	 the	 taxpayer’s	 net	 interest	 to	 EBITDA	 is	 no	 greater	 than	 the	 net	
interest	to	EBITDA	ratio	of	the	group;	and	
	
(4)	 either	 an	 unlimited	 carry	 forward	 of	 disallowed	 interest	 expense,	 an	
unlimited	 carry	 forward	 and	 a	 three-year	 carry	 back	 of	 disallowed	 interest	
expense,	or	an	unlimited	carry	forward	of	disallowed	interest	expense	and	a	five-
year	carry	forward	of	unused	interest	capacity.120	
	
In	 accordance	 with	 this	 Directive,	 most	 EU	 member	 states	 (including	 the	 United	
Kingdom	for	now)	have	either	 retained	or	adopted	 interest	 limitation	 rules	with	an	earnings-
based	fixed	ratio	set	at	30%	of	the	taxpayer’s	net	 interest	expense	to	EBITDA	less	tax-exempt	
income.121	Several	have	also	retained	or	introduced	a	group	ratio	rule	permitting	the	deduction	
of	 interest	 expenses	 above	 the	 fixed	 ratio,	 although	most	of	 these	 rules	 take	 the	 form	of	 an	
																																																						
119	 EU	 Council	 Directive	 2016/1164	 (12	 July	 2016),	 Article	 11(1).	Where	 a	member	 state	 has	 targeted	
rules	for	preventing	BEPS	risks	which	are	“equally	effective”	to	the	interest	limitation	provisions	set	out	
in	the	Directive,	Article	11(6)	provides	that	the	state	may	apply	these	targeted	rules	until	the	earlier	of	
the	 date	 when	 OECD	 members	 publish	 an	 agreement	 on	 minimum	 standards	 for	 BEPS	 Action	 4	 or	
January	1,	2024.		
120	Ibid.,	Article	4.	
121	 Gadwood	 and	 Morton,	 supra	 note	 1	 at	 27-30,	 reporting	 that	 all	 EU	 states	 except	 Finland	 have	
adopted	a	30%	fixed	ratio	of	net	interest	expense	to	earnings,	that	Finland’s	ratio	is	25%	and	Norway	(a	
non-EU	member	state)	has	also	adopted	a	25%	fixed	ratio.		
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assets-based	 equity	 escape	 rule,	 rather	 than	 an	 earnings-based	 rule.122	 As	 well,	 most	 EU	
member	states	permit	an	unlimited	carry	forward	of	disallowed	interest	expense	and	many	also	
allow	a	five-year	carry	forward	of	unused	interest	capacity.123	Finally,	most	EU	member	states	
have	also	adopted	a	de	minimis	monetary	threshold	of	€3	million	or	an	equivalent	amount	 in	
domestic	currency.124	
Outside	the	EU,	however,	countries	appear	to	have	been	much	slower	to	implement	the	
recommendations	of	BEPS	Action	4,	though	at	least	eight	countries	have	retained	or	introduced	
an	earnings-based	fixed	ratio	rule	consistent	with	the	OECD’s	best	practices	approach.125	Most	
significantly	 for	 Canada,	moreover,	 the	United	 States	 amended	 its	 existing	 earnings-stripping	
rule	 effective	 January	 1,	 2018,	 adopting	 an	 earnings-based	 fixed	 ratio	 rule	 that	 limits	 a	
taxpayer’s	deduction	of	net	 interest	expenses	 to	30%	 if	 its	adjusted	 taxable	 income,	which	 is	
based	on	EBITDA	 for	 taxation	 years	 beginning	before	2022	 and	EBIT	 for	 subsequent	 taxation	
years.126	 Although	 this	 provision	 allows	 an	 unlimited	 carry	 forward	 of	 disallowed	 interest	
expense,127	it	does	not	include	a	group	ratio	rule	and	provides	no	carry	over	for	unused	interest	
																																																						
122	Ibid.	at	31-32,	explaining	that	six	EU	member	states	(Finland,	France,	Germany,	Hungary,	Luxembourg	
and	 Malta)	 apply	 an	 equity	 escape	 rule,	 and	 that	 only	 Denmark	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 apply	 an	
earnings-based	group	ratio	rule.	
123	Ibid.	at	33.	
124	Ibid.	at	34-35.	
125	 Ibid.	 at	 27-28,	 reporting	 that	 of	 24	 branch	 reports	 from	 non-EU	 countries	 eight	 (Argentina,	 India,	
Japan,	Norway,	the	Republic	of	Korea,	the	Republic	of	Srpska,	and	the	United	States	of	America)	had	an	
earnings-based	 fixed	 ratio	 rule	 consistent	 with	 the	 OECD’s	 best	 practices	 approach,	 while	 sixteen	
(including	Canada)	did	not.	
126	Internal	Revenue	Code,	§163(j).	Before	2018,	this	provision	limited	the	deduction	of	interest	expenses	
paid	by	U.S.	corporations	to	non-residents	and	tax-exempt	entities	to	50%	of	adjusted	taxable	income,	
with	a	safe-harbour	if	the	corporation’s	debt	to	equity	ratio	did	not	exceed	1.5	to	1.	
127	Ibid.	§163(j)(2).	
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capacity.	Nor	does	it	include	a	general	monetary	threshold,	though	it	exempts	small	businesses	
with	average	gross	receipts	of	$25	million	or	less	over	the	previous	three	years.128	
Whither	Canada?	
	
	 As	 explained	 earlier	 in	 this	 article,	 although	 Canada	 has	 several	 rules	 that	 limit	 the	
deduction	 of	 interest	 expenses	 for	 international	 tax	 planning,	 its	 thin	 capitalization	 rules	 are	
deficient	 in	 several	 respects,129	 and	 it	 has	 failed	 to	 adopt	 any	 general	 limitation	 on	 the	
deduction	of	 interest	expenses	on	borrowed	money	used	 to	produce	exempt	dividends	 from	
foreign	 affiliates	 –	notwithstanding	 recommendations	 to	 this	 effect	 dating	back	 to	 the	1990s	
and	 limitations	 proposed	 in	 the	 2007	 Federal	 Budget.130	 As	 the	 Advisory	 Panel	 on	 Canada’s	
System	of	 International	Taxation	emphasized	 in	2008,	 the	main	 reason	 to	 reject	more	 robust	
limits	on	the	deduction	of	interest	expenses	is	not	theoretical,	but	a	pragmatic	concern	about	
international	 competitiveness	 in	 an	 environment	 in	which	 other	 countries	 do	 not	 apply	 such	
limits	on	the	deduction	of	interest	expenses	for	international	tax	planning.131	A	key	objective	of	
BEPS	 Action	 4	 was	 to	 address	 this	 collective	 action	 by	 promoting	 “a	 consistent	 approach	
utilising	 international	 best	 practices”132	 --	 towards	 which	 it	 expects	 domestic	 rules	 to	
converge.133	
																																																						
128	Ibid.	§163(j)(3).	
129	Supra	notes	17-33	and	accompanying	text.	
130	Supra	notes	34-51	and	accompanying	 text.	As	explained	earlier,	 the	 foreign	affiliate	dumping	 rules	
play	a	more	limited	role	and	are	only	partly	designed	to	address	concerns	regarding	the	deductibility	of	
interest	expenses.	
131	 Report	 of	 the	 Advisory	 Panel,	 supra	 note	 25	 at	 paras.	 4.165	 and	 4.166,	 cited	 at	 supra,	 text	
accompanying	note	46.	
132	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	4,	supra	note	5	at	18,	cited	at	supra,	text	accompanying	note	53.	
133	OECD	Background	Brief,	supra	note	54	at	9,	cited	at	supra,	text	accompanying	note	54.	
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	 Although	 it	 is	 fair	 to	 conclude	 that	 implementation	 of	 the	 recommendations	 in	 BEPS	
Action	4	 is,	 as	 a	 recent	 report	 concludes,	 “very	much	ongoing”,134	 it	 is	 notable	 that	most	 EU	
member	 states	 have	 adopted	 a	 version	 of	 the	 OECD’s	 best	 practices	 approach	 including	 in	
particular	 an	 earnings-based	 fixed	 ratio	 rule,	 and	 that	 the	 United	 States	 and	 several	 other	
countries	 have	 also	 introduced	 earnings-based	 fixed	 ratio	 rules	 consistent	 with	 the	 main	
recommendation	of	BEPS	Action	4.135	At	the	same	time,	corporate	rate	reductions	in	the	United	
States	and	the	United	Kingdom	have	increased	the	risk	of	profit	shifting	out	of	Canada.136	In	this	
changed	international	environment,	it	is	time	for	Canada	to	revisit	its	rules	for	the	deduction	of	
interest	expenses,	having	regard	to	the	best	practices	in	BEPS	Action	4	and	the	implementation	
of	interest	limitation	rules	in	EU	member	states	and	the	United	States.	
	 To	this	end,	Canada	should	start	with	an	earnings-based	fixed	ratio	rule	consistent	with	
the	rules	adopted	by	EU	member	states	and	the	United	States,	limiting	a	taxpayer’s	net	interest	
expenses	to	30%	of	its	EBITDA	less	exempt	dividends	from	foreign	affiliates.	However	deficient	
EBITDA	may	be	as	a	reliable	and	consistent	measure	of	an	entity’s	earnings	and	however	crude	
a	30%	ratio	is	as	a	benchmark	for	limiting	the	deduction	of	interest	expenses,	this	approach	has	
clearly	become	the	norm	in	many	countries	and	would	address	at	least	some	of	the	deficiencies	
in	Canada’s	thin	capitalization	rules	and	impose	a	valuable	limit	on	the	deduction	of	interest	on	
borrowed	money	 that	 is	used	 to	 finance	outbound	 investments	producing	exempt	dividends.	
Although	one	might	expect	this	30%	ratio	to	decrease	over	time	as	these	rules	become	more	
common,	particularly	 if	they	are	combined	with	a	group	ratio	rule	providing	relief	for	 interest	
																																																						
134	Gadwood	and	Morton,	supra	note	1	at	27.	
135	Supra,	text	accompanying	notes	119-128.	
136	Supra,	text	accompanying	note	9.	
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expenses	exceeding	the	fixed	ratio,	there	is	no	reason	why	Canada	should	adopt	a	lower	ratio	
than	other	countries,	particularly	when	Canada	has	had	no	prior	experience	with	an	earnings-
based	fixed	ratio	rule.	
	 Consistent	with	the	best	practices	approach	in	BEPS	Action	4,	this	fixed	ratio	rule	should	
at	a	minimum	apply	to	entities	that	are	members	of	a	multinational	group,	which	as	an	initial	
matter	 may	 be	 defined	 either	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 direct	 and	 indirect	 control	 or	 according	 to	
consolidated	financial	statements.137	As	with	Canada’s	thin	capitalization	rules,	however,	which	
apply	at	a	lower	threshold	of	ownership,	these	definitions	might	be	expanded	In	order	to	limit	
opportunities	for	avoidance	through	payments	to	related	parties	that	are	not	members	of	the	
multinational	group.	Also	like	Canada’s	thin	capitalization	rules,	the	rule	should	presumably	also	
apply	 to	 interest	 payments	 by	 trusts	 and	 partnerships,	 as	 well	 as	 non-residents	 carrying	 on	
business	in	Canada.	
	 Also	 consistent	 with	 the	 best	 practices	 approach,	 the	 rule	 should	 probably	 include	 a	
monetary	threshold	and	an	exemption	for	long-term	public	infrastructure	projects.	Although	a	
monetary	threshold	would	have	to	be	applied	at	the	level	of	a	domestic	group	or	accompanied	
by	 anti-fragmentation	 rules	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 abuse,138	 such	 a	 threshold	 could	 reduce	
administrative	 and	 compliance	 costs	 for	 small-	 and	 medium-sized	 enterprises	 for	 which	 the	
																																																						
137	 In	 addition	 to	 taxpayers	 that	 are	 members	 of	 multinational	 groups,	 it	 can	 also	 be	 argued	 that	
payments	 to	 tax	 exempt	 entities	 should	 also	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 limitation	 on	 the	 deduction	 of	 interest	
expenses	on	the	grounds	that	these	interest	payments	erode	the	Canadian	tax	base	in	the	same	way	as	
interest	payments	 to	non-residents.	Brian	Arnold,	 “The	Arnold	Report”	no.	114	 (November	14,	2018).	
This	article	does	not	address	this	proposal.	
138	 Since	 Canada	 does	 tax	 corporate	 groups	 on	 a	 consolidated	 basis,	 it	 may	 make	 more	 sense	 to	
introduce	anti-fragmentation	rules	than	to	define	the	concept	of	a	domestic	group	for	the	purposes	of	
applying	 a	 monetary	 threshold	 –	 even	 though	 similar	 considerations	 presumably	 enter	 into	 either	
exercise.		
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risks	of	BEPS	are	likely	less	than	they	are	for	larger	MNEs.	In	addition,	as	explained	earlier,	most	
EU	member	 states	 have	 also	 adopted	 a	 de	minimis	 monetary	 threshold	 of	 €3	 million	 or	 an	
equivalent	 amount	 in	 domestic	 currency,139	 and	 the	United	 States	 exempts	 small	 businesses	
with	 average	 gross	 receipts	 of	 $25	 million	 or	 less	 over	 the	 previous	 three	 years.140	 An	
exemption	for	long-term	public	infrastructure	is	incorporated	into	Article	4	of	the	EU	ATAD	and	
is	generally	justified	on	the	grounds	these	projects	involve	little	or	no	risk	of	BEPS.		
	 Whether	 Canada	 should	 also	 adopt	 a	 group	 ratio	 rule,	 however,	 is	much	 less	 certain.	
Although	a	group	ratio	rule	has	a	more	principled	rationale	than	a	fixed	ratio	rule,	such	a	rule	
would	add	another	layer	of	complexity	to	what	would	already	be	a	novel	set	of	rules,	and	could	
be	difficult	to	administer	even	with	financial	 information	available	from	consolidated	financial	
statements.	As	well,	the	need	for	a	supplementary	group	ratio	rule	is	reduced	if	the	fixed	ratio	
rule	adopts	a	relatively	high	ratio	 like	30%,	which	is	a	the	top	of	the	OECD’s	suggested	range.	
For	 these	 reasons,	 it	 is	 perhaps	 not	 surprising	 that	 neither	 the	 United	 States	 nor	 many	 EU	
member	states	have	opted	to	enact	a	group	ratio	rule	in	addition	to	their	earnings-based	fixed	
ratio	rules.	For	all	these	reasons,	Canada	might	reasonably	defer	the	introduction	of	any	group	
ratio	 rule	 in	order	 to	benefit	 from	other	 countries’	 experience	and	until	 such	 time	as	a	 fixed	
ratio	 is	 reduced.	 If	 and	when	 Canada	 does	 adopt	 a	 group	 ratio	 rule,	 it	 should	 also	 consider	
whether	an	equity	escape	rule	would	be	 less	complex	and	easier	to	explain	than	an	earnings-
based	approach.	
	 Without	a	group	ratio	rule,	of	course,	taxpayers	whose	net	interest	expenses	exceed	the	
fixed	ratio	will	not	be	able	to	deduct	these	expenses	even	if	their	net	interest	to	EBITDA	ratio	is	
																																																						
139	Supra,	text	accompanying	note	124.	
140	Supra,	text	accompanying	note	128.	
	 34	
less	than	that	of	the	worldwide	group	or	their	equity	to	asset	ratio	equals	or	exceeds	that	of	the	
worldwide	group.	Where	the	fixed	ratio	 is	based	on	net	 interest	expenses	to	EBITDA,	this	 is	a	
particular	concern	for	entities	with	volatile	earnings,	which	may	have	negative	EBITDA,	resulting	
in	the	disallowance	of	all	net	interest	expenses.	In	this	case,	it	is	arguable	that	a	fixed	ratio	rule	
should	be	accompanied	by	relatively	generous	carryovers	for	disallowed	interest	expense	and	
unused	interest	capacity.	On	the	other	hand,	as	explained	earlier,	these	carryovers	can	create	
new	BEPS	risks	since	entities	with	unused	interest	capacity	that	can	be	carried	forward	could	be	
encouraged	to	increase	net	interest	expenses	or	decrease	EBITDA	in	future	years,	and	entities	
with	disallowed	interest	expenses	that	can	be	carried	back	may	be	encouraged	to	increase	net	
interest	 expenses	 or	 decrease	 EBITDA	 in	 the	 current	 taxation	 year	 order	 to	 utilize	 unused	
interest	 capacity	 in	 previous	 years.141	 As	 well,	 carryover	 provisions	 create	 valuable	 tax	
attributes	 that	 must	 be	 subject	 to	 anti-avoidance	 rules	 preventing	 their	 transfer	 to	 other	
taxpayers,	adding	to	complexity.	
Although	most	EU	member	states	appear	to	have	adopted	relatively	generous	carryover	
provisions	for	disallowed	interest	expenses	and	unused	interest	capacity,	the	United	States	and	
most	other	non-EU	countries	have	introduced	more	limited	carryover	provisions	allowing	only	
the	 carry	 forward	 of	 disallowed	 interest	 expenses	without	 any	 time	 limit.142	 Considering	 the	
potential	problems	associated	with	more	generous	carryover	provisions,	Canada	would	be	wise	
to	limit	any	carryovers	to	the	carry	forward	of	disallowed	interest	expenses	–	which,	as	in	the	
United	States	and	many	other	countries	might	reasonably	be	without	any	time	limit.	If	this	form	
																																																						
141	Supra,	text	accompanying	note	113.	
142	Gadwood	and	Morton,	supra	note	2	at	33.	
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of	relief	is	considered	inadequate,	it	would	be	better	to	reconsider	a	group	ratio	rule	than	more	
generous	carryover	provisions.	
A	 further	 question	 concerns	 the	 status	 of	 existing	 rules	 restricting	 the	 deduction	 of	
interest	expenses	for	international	tax	planning,	specifically	the	thin	capitalization	rules	and	the	
foreign	 affiliate	 dumping	 rules.	 Although	 it	 might	 be	 argued	 that	 these	 rules	 would	 be	
unnecessary	 if	 Canada	were	 to	 adopt	 a	more	 general	 rule	 limiting	 the	 deduction	 of	 interest	
expenses,	 these	 rules	also	 serve	other	purposes	–	effectively	 re-characterizing	debt	as	equity	
(and	interest	payments	as	dividends)	in	the	case	of	the	thin	capitalization	rules	and	preventing	
surplus-stripping	 in	 the	case	of	 the	 foreign	affiliate	dumping	rules.	As	well,	 the	best	practices	
approach	 in	BEPS	Action	4	 includes	targeted	anti-avoidance	rules	 in	addition	to	more	general	
rules	limiting	the	deduction	of	interest	expenses.	For	these	reasons,	it	would	be	best	for	Canada	
to	retain	these	rules.	
Finally,	 since	 a	more	 general	 limitation	 on	 the	 deduction	 of	 interest	 expenses	 in	 the	
international	context	will	presumably	increase	government	revenues,	some	thought	should	be	
given	 to	 accompanying	 measures	 that	 might	 enhance	 Canada’s	 international	 tax	
competitiveness,	particularly	in	an	environment	where	other	countries,	particularly	the	United	
States,	have	significantly	reduced	their	corporate	tax	rates	largely	eliminating	what	had	been	a	
significant	tax	advantage	for	Canada.	Short	of	more	fundamental	reforms	that	would	require	a	
more	 comprehensive	 review	 of	 Canada’s	 tax	 system,143	 these	 measures	 might	 reasonably	
include	phased	reductions	in	the	federal	corporate	tax	rate	that	would	lessen	the	risk	of	profit-
																																																						
143	See,	e.g.,	McKenzie	and	Smart,	supra	note	8	at	537,	expressing	a	preference	for	“a	more	fundamental	
corporate	tax-system	reform	along	the	lines	of	a	rent	tax,	rather	than	tinkering	with	depreciation	
allowances	and/or	the	statutory	rate	
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shifting	out	of	Canada	and	incentivize	future	investment	in	Canada	without	creating	significant	
windfall	gains	for	existing	investments.	
